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Abstract
Structural properties of two well-known families of keystream genera-
tors, Shrinking Generators and Cellular Automata, have been analyzed.
Emphasis is on the equivalence of the binary sequences obtained from both
kinds of generators. In fact, Shrinking Generators (SG) can be identified
with a subset of linear Cellular Automata (mainly rule 90, rule 150 or a
hybrid combination of both rules). The linearity of these cellular mod-
els can be advantageously used in the cryptanalysis of those keystream
generators.
1 Introduction
Cellular Automata (CA) are discrete dynamic systems characterized by a simple
structure but a complex behavior [1, 2, 3]. This configuration makes them very
attractive to be used in the generation of pseudorandom sequences. In this sense,
CA are studied in order to obtain a characterization of the rules (mapping to the
next state) producing sequences with maximal length, balancedness and good
distribution of 1’s and 0’s. From a cryptographic point of view, it is fundamental
to analyze some additional characteristics of these generators, such as linear
complexity or correlation-immunity. The results of this study point toward the
equivalence between the sequences generated by CA and those obtained from
Linear Feedback Shift Registers-based models [4].
In this paper, CA hybrid configurations constructed from combinations of
rules 90 and 150 are considered. In fact, a linear model that describes the
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behavior of a kind of pseudorandom sequence generator, the so-called shrinking
generator (SG), has been derived. In this way, the sequences generated by SG
can be studied in terms of CA. Thus, all the theoretical background on CA
found in the literature can be applied to the analysis and/or cryptanalysis of
shrinking generators.
2 General description of the basic structures
The two basic structures are introduced:
2.1 The Shrinking Generator
It is a very simple generator with good cryptographic properties [5]. This gen-
erator is composed by two LFSRs: a control register, called R1, that decimates
the sequence produced by the other register, called R2. The sequence produced
by the LFSR R1, that is {ai}, controls the bits of the sequence produced by
R2, that is {bi}, which are included in the output sequence {cj} (the shrunken
sequence) , according to the following rule:
1. If ai = 1 =⇒ cj = bi
2. If ai = 0 =⇒ bi is discarded.
Example 1: Consider the following LFSRs:
1. R1 with length L1 = 3, feedback polynomial 1 +D +D
3 and initial state
(1, 0, 0). The sequence obtained is {0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1} with period 7.
2. R2 with length L2 = 4, feedback polynomial 1+D
3+D4 and initial state
(1, 0, 0, 0). The sequence obtained is {0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1}
with period 15.
The output sequence {cj} will be determined by:
• {ai} → 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 .....
• {bi} → 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 .....
• {cj} → 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 .....
The underlined bits 0 or 1 in {bi} are discarded.
According to [5], the period of the shrunken sequence is
T = (2L2 − 1)2(L1−1) (1)
and its linear complexity, notated LC, satisfies the following inequality
L2 2
(L1−2) < LC ≤ L2 2
(L1−1). (2)
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A simple calculation allows one to compute the number of 1’s in the shrunken
sequence. Such a number is
No.1′s = 2(L2−1)2(L1−1). (3)
Thus, the shrunken sequence is a quasi-balanced sequence. Since simplicity is
one of its most remarkable characteristics, this scheme is suitable for practical
implementation of efficient stream cipher cryptosystems.
2.2 Cellular Automata
An one-dimensional cellular automaton can be described as a n-cell register,
whose binary stages are updated at the same time depending on a k -variable
function [3] also called rule. If k = 2r + 1 input variables are considered, then
there is a total of 2k different neighborhood configurations. Therefore, for a
binary cellular automaton there can be up to 22
k
different mappings to the next
state. Such mappings are the different rules Φ. In fact, the next state xt+1i of
the cell xti depends on the current state of k neighbor cells
xt+1i = Φ(x
t
i−r , . . . , x
t
i, . . . , x
t
i+r) (4)
If these functions are composed exclusively by XOR and/or XNOR operations,
then CA are said to be additive. In this case, the next state (xt+11 , . . . , x
t+1
n )
can be computed from the current state (xt1, . . . , x
t
n) such as follows:
(xt+11 , ..., x
t+1
n ) = (x
t
1, ..., x
t
n).A+ C (5)
where A is an nxn matrix with binary coefficients and C is the complemen-
tary vector.
In CA, either all cells evolve under the same rule (uniform case) or they
follow different rules (hybrid case). At the ends of the array, two different
boundary conditions are possible: null automata whether cells with permanent
null content are supposed adjacent to the extreme cells or periodic automata
whether extreme cells are supposed adjacent.
In this paper, all automata considered will be null hybrid CA with rules 90
y 150. For k = 3, these rules are described such as follows :
• rule 90 → xt+1i = x
t
i−1 + x
t
i+1
111 110 101 100 011 010 001 000
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
01011010 (binary) = 90 (decimal).
• rule 150 → xt+1i = x
t
i−1 + x
t
i + x
t
i+1
111 110 101 100 011 010 001 000
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
10010110 (binary) = 150 (decimal).
The main idea of this work is to write a given SG in terms of a hybrid
cellular automaton, where at least one of its output sequences equals the SG
output sequence.
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3 A shrinking generator linear model in terms
of cellular automata
In this section, an algorithm to determine the one-dimensional linear hybrid
CA corresponding to a particular shrinking generator is presented. Such an
algorithm is based on the following facts:
Fact 1: The characteristic polynomial of the shrunken sequence [5] is of the
form
P (D)N (6)
where P (D) is a L2-degree primitive polynomial and N satisfies the in-
equality 2(L1−2) < N ≤ 2(L1−1).
Fact 2: P (D) depends exclusively on the characteristic polynomial of the
register R2 and on the length L1 of the register R1. Moreover, P (D) is
the characteristic polynomial of cyclotomic coset 2L1 − 1, see [4]. This
result can be proved in the same way as the lower bound on the LC is
derived in reference [5].
Fact 3: Rule 90 at the end of the array in a null automaton is equivalent to
two consecutive rules 150 with identical sequences. Reciprocally, rule 150
at the end of the array in a null automaton is equivalent to two consecutive
rules 90 with identical sequences.
According to the previous facts, the following algorithm is introduced:
Input: Two LFSR’s R1 and R2 with their corresponding lengths, L1 and L2,
and the characteristic polynomials P2(D) of the register R2.
Step 1: From L1 and P2(D), compute the polynomial P (D). In fact, P (D)
is the characteristic polynomial of the cyclotomic coset E, where E =
20+21+ . . .+2L1−1. Thus, P (D) = (D+αE)(D+α2E) . . . (D+α2
L1−1E)
α being a primitive root in GF (2L2).
Step 2: From P (D), apply the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm [6] to
determine the two linear hybrid CA whose characteristic polynomial is
P (D). Such CA are written as binary strings with the following codifica-
tion: 0 = rule 90 and 1 = rule 150.
Step 3: For each one of the previous binary strings representing the CA, we
proceed:
3.1 Complement its least significant bit. The resulting binary string is
notated S.
3.2 Compute the mirror image of S, notated S∗, and concatenate both
strings Sc = S ∗ S
∗.
3.3 Apply steps 3.1 and 3.2 to Sc recursively L1 − 1 times.
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Output: Two binary strings codifying the CA corresponding to the given
SG.
Remark that the characteristic polynomial of the register R1 is not needed.
Due to the particular form of the shrunken sequence characteristic polynomial,
it can be noticed that the computation of the CA is proportional to L1 instead
of 2L1 . Consequently, the algorithm can be applied to SG in a range of cryp-
tographic interest (e.g. L1, L2 ≈ 64). In order to clarify the previous steps a
simple numerical example is presented.
Example 2: Consider the following LFSRs: R1 with length L1 = 2 and R2
with length L2 = 5 and characteristic polynomial P2(D) = 1+D+D
3+D4+D5.
Step 1: P (D) is the characteristic polynomial of the cyclotomic coset 3. Thus,
P (D) = 1 +D2 +D5.
Step 2: From P (D) and applying the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm,
two linear hybrid CA whose characteristic polynomial is P (D) can be
determined. Such CA are written as:
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
Step 3: The two binary strings of length L = 10 representing the required CA
are:
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
with the corresponding codification above mentioned. The procedure has
been carried out once as L1 − 1 = 1.
From L = 10 known bits of the shrunken sequence {cj}, the whole sequence,
whose period T = 62, can be easily reconstructed. In fact, let {cj} be of the
form
{cj} = {0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 ...},
then the initial state of the cellular automaton can be computed from right to
left (or viceversa), according to the corresponding rules 90 and 150. Tables
1 depicts the computation of the initial state for the first automaton. The
shrunken sequence is placed at the most right column.
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90 150 150 150 90 90 150 150 150 90
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0
1 0
1
Table. 1 - The shrunken sequence is at the most right column
Once the corresponding initial states are known, then the cellular automata
will produce their corresponding output sequences and the shrunken sequence
can be univocally determined.
In fact, CA computed by the previous algorithm will generate all the possible
sequences {xi} that are solutions of the difference equation
[P (E)]2
L1−1
{xi} = 0 (7)
E being the shifting operator on xi (i.e. Exi = xi+1). The shrunken se-
quence {cj} is just a particular solution of the previous equation. The different
sequences {xi} are distributed into the different state cycles of each automa-
ton. Once a specific sequence is fixed in a particular cell, e. g. the shrunken
sequence at the most right cell in the previous example, the location of the
other sequences is univocally determined. In addition, every particular solution
{xi} can be generated by every automaton cell depending on the state cycle
considered. In terms of LFSR-based generators, the solution sequences {xi}
correspond to sequences generated by different combinations of LFSRs: clock-
controlled shrinking generators [7], shrinking generators with distinct rules of
decimation, irregular clocking of the register R2 based on particular stages of
the register R1 etc. All these generators are included in a simple automaton.
4 Applications of the CA-based model to the
cryptanalysis of the shrinking generator
Since a linear model describing the behavior of the SG has been derived, the
cryptanalysis of such a generator can be considered from different points of view:
• Crytanalysis based on the SG linear complexity: attacking the SG through
its linear complexity requires the knowledge of LC bits of the shrunken
sequence, LC being its linear complexity, or equivalently, the length of the
cellular automaton. Remark that this is just half the sequence required by
the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [8] to reconstruct the original sequence.
6
• Crytanalysis based on the Linear Consistency Test (LCT): The linear
consistency test [9] is a general divide-and-conquer cryptanalytic attack
that can be applied to the SG on the basis of the linear models provided
by the cellular automata. This attack would require the exhaustive search
through all possible initial states of the LFSR R2.
• A new attack that exploits the weaknesses inherent to the CA-based linear
model can be also considered. Such an attack will be specified in next
section.
5 Phaseshift analysis of CA sequences
If the Bardell’s algorithm to phaseshift analysis of CA [10] is applied, then it is
possible to calculate the relation among the sequences obtained from CA. In fact,
in [10] it was shown that the characteristic equation determines the recursion
relationship among the bits in the output sequences of a hybrid 90/150 CA. A
shift operator was used in conjunction with a table of discrete logarithms to
determine the phaseshift analytically.
Although the characteristic equation in [10] is a primitive polynomial P (D),
it can be proved that the algorithm is valid for P (D)n too.
Example 3: Let us consider a CA with the following characteristics:
• The automaton length L = 10
• Rule distribution: 0011001100
• P (D) = (1 +D +D2 +D4 +D5)2.
Let S be a shift operator defined in GF (2) which operates on Xi, the state
of the i-th cell , such as follows:
Xi(t+ 1) = SXi(t) (8)
we can write
X1(t+ 1) = X2(t) (9)
as
SX1(t) = X2(t) (10)
or simply
SX1 = X2. (11)
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The difference equation system is as follows:
SX1 = X2
SX2 = X1 +X3
SX3 = X2 +X3 +X4
SX4 = X3 +X4 +X5
SX5 = X4 +X6
SX6 = X5 +X7
SX7 = X6 +X7 +X8
SX8 = X7 +X8 +X9
SX9 = X8 +X10
SX10 = X9
Expressing each Xi as a function of X10, we obtain the following system:
X1 = (S
9 + S4 + S3 + S2 + S + 1)X10
X2 = (S
8 + S6 + S5 + S4 + S3 + S + 1)X10
X3 = (S
7 + S6 + S5 + S3 + 1)X10
X4 = (S
6)X10
X5 = (S
5 + S3 + 1)X10
X6 = (S
4 + S)X10
X7 = (S
3 + S2 + 1)X10
X8 = (S
2 + 1)X10
X9 = (S)X10
Now taking logarithms in both sides,
log(X1) = log(S
9 + S4 + S3 + S2 + S + 1) + log(X10)
log(X2) = log(S
8 + S6 + S5 + S4 + S3 + S + 1) +
+ log(X10)
log(X3) = log(S
7 + S6 + S5 + S3 + 1) + log(X10)
log(X4) = log(S
6) + log(X10)
log(X5) = log(S
5 + S3 + 1) + log(X10)
log(X6) = log(S
4 + S) + log(X10)
log(X7) = log(S
3 + S2 + 1) + log(X10)
log(X8) = log(S
2 + 1) + log(X10)
log(X9) = log(S) + log(X10)
On the other hand, we have:
D26modP (D) = D2 + 1. (12)
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Next we define,
log(D) ≡ 1 (13)
According to the algorithm proposed by Bardell, we can identify the follow-
ing equations:
log(X9)− log(X10) = 1
log(X8)− log(X10) = 26
log(X4)− log(X10) = 6
and,
log(X2)− log(X1) = 1
log(X3)− log(X1) = 26
log(X7)− log(X1) = 6
According to the previous results, the same binary sequence is generated in
cells 1, 2, 3 and 7 as well as the same sequence is produced in cells 10, 9, 8 and
4. The phaseshifts of the outputs 2, 3 and 7 relative to cell 1 are 1, 26 and 6
respectively. Similar values are obtained in the other group of cells, that is cells
4, 8 and 9 relative to cell 10. The rest of cells generate different sequences.
Studying the distance among the shifted sequences and concatenating them,
the original sequence can be reconstructed. Nevertheless, the shifts among the
different shrunken sequences depend on the particular structure of the automa-
ton considered. In fact, once the automaton is known the Bardell’s algorithm
has to be applied.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, the relationship between LFSR-based structures and cellular au-
tomata have been stressed. More precisely, a particular family of LFSR-based
keystream generators, the so-called Shrinking Generators, has been analyzed
and identified with a subset of linear cellular automata. In fact, a linear model
describing the behavior of the SG has been derived.
The algorithm to convert the SG into a CA-based linear model is very simple
and can be applied to shrinking generators in a range of practical interest. The
key idea of this algorithm is that the number of steps to be carried out is
proportional to L1 instead of 2
L1 .
Once the linear equivalent model has been developed, the linearity of this
cellular model can be advantageously used in the analysis and/or cryptanalysis
of the SG. Besides the traditional cryptanalitic attacks (e.g. the linear complex-
ity attack that here requires half the sequence needed by the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm and the LCT attack), an outline of a new attack that exploits the
weaknesses inherent to these CA has been introduced too.
9
The proposed linear model is believed to be a very useful tool to analyze the
strength of the sequence produced by a SG as a keystream generator in stream
ciphers procedures.
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